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Gacaca Courts: The Hope for Reconciliation in the Aftermath of the
Rwandan Genocide
By Maureen E. Laflin
Throughout the world, nations and communities are turning
increasingly to alternative dispute resolttion methods in an
attempt to leal wounds cut by years of ethnic, cultural, and
religious conflicts. Rwanda is making a creative and promising
effort to adapt its traditional community-based dispute resolution
method, the Gacaca Courts, to punish the perpetrators of the
genocide which took place in 1994 and to bring resolve and
reconciliation to the country.
Over a span of just one hundred days in 1994, upwards of
1,000,000 people died in the genocide in Rwanda. As one author
commented, "The Rwandan genocide stands out from other
atrocities in a number of ways: It was astounding in the number
and concentration of deaths, the intensity of the killing, the
extensive use of rape as a form of ethnic violence, and the massive
involvement of the Rwandan population."' Rwanda's population
prior to the genocide was between seven and eight million people.
The website for the Rwandan government states, "The 1994
genocide was a carefully planned and executed exercise to
annihilate Rwanda's Tutsi population and Hutus who did not agree
with the prevailing extremist politics of the Habyarimana regime.
One million lives were lost in only one hundred days. It is the
fastest and most vicious genocide in human history."-
Today Rwanda continues to struggle with its brutal past, an
impoverished present, and a future clouded in uncertainty. Many
place hope in the country's traditional dispute resolution system,
the Gacaca courts, to reconcile decades of division and hatred.
The genocide must be understood in the country's historical
context, and yet this is not really possible. There is no agreement
about the historical interrelationship between the Hutu and the
Tutsi. Some, including the current government, claim the two
groups co-existed for centuries. Others claim the tension began
hundreds of years ago when the Tutsi herders and warriors moved
into Rwanda and created a quasi-feudal system.' It is unclear if
Rwanda and the international community will ever reconcile this
issue. What is known is that most of the victims of the genocide
were from the minority Tutsi community and that most but not all
the perpetrators were Hutus. I
During the three decades following Rwanda's independence in
1962, hundreds of thousands of Tutsis were killed, exiled or fled
into neighboring countries. This ethnic tension increased from
1990 until early 1994 as the Rwandan government forces and the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the army of the Tutsi refugees or
expatriates, engaged in anl on-going, yet sporadic armed conflict.
This fighting culminated in the one hundred days of genocide. The
genocide ultimately ended when the RPF took control of the
capital city of Kigali, and the Hutus fled. The RPF established a
new government called the Government of National Unity.
The government's web page captures the state of the country
post-genocide:
The government of national unity inherited a deeply
scarred nation where trust within and between
communities had been replaced by fear and betrayal,
whose economy had ground to a complete halt, where
social services were not functioning, and public
confidence in the state had been shattered. Almost the
entire nation was either internally displaced or had been
forced to flee to neighbouring countries by the
perpetrators of the genocide.
In July 1994, the Government of National Unity made it one of
its top priorities to apprehend and bring to justice the perpetrators
of the genocide. The Government made it clear that there could be
no reconciliation without justice and that it would ensure
individual accountability for the perpetrators. How to find
"justice" in the wake of the genocide and the years of conflict prior
thereto presents a daunting task.
The enormity of this task begins at the most Fundamental level.
Rwandese cannot even agree upon basic facts. Other than the
actual dates of the genocide, little else is agreed upon. As the
Organization of African Unity's (OAU) International Panel of
Eminent Personalities noted, "[Tihere are hardly any important
aspects of the story that are not complex and controversial; it is
almost impossible to write on the subject without inadvertently
oversimplilying something or angering someone."' The disputed
topics go not only to the causes and historical tensions between the
Hutus and Tutsis before the genocide, but include as well how
many people died, where they died, and who participated in their
killing. There is so little agreement over the facts that the Rwandese
have 'agreed' that history cannot be taught in their schools.
The estimates of the number of people who died varies from
500,000 to 1,000,000. Either number is unthinkable. As the
Organization of African Unity notes about the numbers, "the truth
is that we have no way of being certain. The fact is that even if the
most conservative figure is used, it still means that over three-
quarters of the entire population registered as Tutsi were
systematically killed in just over 100 days."'
The names, identities, and number of perpetrators are also
disputed. What is clear is that hundreds of thousands of people,
both Hutus and Tutsis, participated in what has been called a
"populist genocide.", Tile estimates of the number of persons
directly or indirectly involved in the genocide run as high as one
million people.' In contrast to modern technological warfare, these
killings were not depersonalized or sanitized by distance,
anonymity, or high tech equipment. Numerous accounts describe
teachers killing students, neighbors hacking neighbors to death in
their homes, clerics murdering parishioners, doctors intentionally
terminating the lives of patients, and even children as young as
eight participating in killings. Assailants used household tools such
as machetes. Others used sticks and clubs, causing their victims to
endure slow, agonizing deaths."' The accounts are gruesome.
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The widespread participation of so many, the alleged
propaganda campaign which "forced" people to participate, and
the close, slow, and brutal nature of so man), of the killings make
the Rwandan incident unique from other tragedies. It has been
described as the "most efficient mass killing since the atomic
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.""
The addition of non-deadly physical violence, the destruction
of property, and theft further complicate the situation. While
Tutsis suffered the brunt of the atrocities, Hutus who were viewed
as too sympathetic to the Tutsis were also brutalized and killed.
Tutsis and Hutus were both victims and perpetrators. Allegations
of gross human rights violations have been filed against Tutsis for
their actions during and after tie genocide. The lack of a clear
demarcation betveen perpetrator and victim makes the task of
sorting through the situation even more complicated.
The impoverished nature of Rwanda after the genocide further
compounds the situation. The World Bank described Rwanda as
the poorest country on earth. Seventy percent of the population
lived below the poverty level; little in the country worked; and
most of the infrastructure was destroyed during the genocide.'-
Given the horrific nature of the situation, the current
government has had to determine how to resolve the overwhelming
human rights problems and achieve some measure of reconciliation
in the country. Amnesty International has characterized the
problem as "how to efficiently combat an ingrained culture of
impunity and foster reconciliation between two communities
whose mutual distrust and political rivalry has caused so much
death and suffering over a prolonged period of time.""
In contrast to South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation
Commission which granted amnesty for full and complete truth,
Rwandan's government has opted for a more punitive justice
approach vowing to ensure individual criminal accountability for all
perpetrators. Three forums-the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda, the domestic criminal justice system, and the Gacaca
courts-all seek to address the crimes and human rights violations
during the genocide. The country played a critical role in the
creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
located in Arusha, Tanzania. Unfortunately in seven and one-half
years, the ICTR has brought less than a dozen cases to judgment."
The pre-genocide judicial system in Rwanda was extremely
weak, suffering from limited resources, insufficiently trained
personnel, and a lack of judicial independence. The genocide
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totally destroyed it. For over two years following the genocide the
country was without a functioning legal system. Not until the
latter part of 1996 did the Rwandan judiciary become operational
once again." By the end of 2001, the country's domestic criminal
justice system had conducted approximately five thousand
genocide-related trials, leaving approximately 125,000 suspects
still in jails or prisons designed to accommodate only 15,000." It
has been estimated that using the conventional court system
would take over two hundred years to try the cases of those already
incarcerated for crimes related to the genocide. " There are simply
not enough judges, prosecutors, and lawyers. Post genocide, most
qualified professionals either fled the country or were disqualified
from the legal processes due to their own participation in the
atrocities. In mid-July 1994, the qualified bench and bar consisted
of five judges, none of whom had functioning cars or offices, and
fifty lawyers, some of whom refused to defend the accused." The
country had to create another forum to resolve its disputes.
With the realization that the current judicial system was woefilly
inadequate to handle the situation, the government turned to the
country's traditional dispute resolution method, the gacaca courts,
to address the burgeoning caseload, to pursue retributive justice, to
rebuild a sense of community; and to reconcile the country's past.
Amnesty International describes the process as "an ambitious,
groundbreaking attempt to restore the Rwandese social fabric torn
by armed conflict and genocide by locating the trial of those alleged
to have participated in the genocide within the communities in
which the offenses were committed."'
The contemporary gacaca courts, legally sanctioned in January
2001, are adaptations of the traditional Rwandese method of
dispute resolution. Gacaca is Kinyarwanda for "lawn" or "lawn
justice" which is where the local community traditionally gathered
to settle disputes.2" Historically, the elders in a community
presided over informal, temporary, ad hoc proceedings to address
conflicts within the community. "The primary goal was to restore
social order, after sanctioning the violation of shared values,
through the re-integration of offenders into the community."2'
The government has taken this traditional method and saddled
it with western criminal justice concepts and procedures. The
question is whether the merging of these two philosophies can
bring forth reconciliation. Many guardedly hope so but maintain
misgivings at the herculean task before this financially, culturally,
and historically impoverished country.
While the contemporary courts retain certain characteristics of
the traditional or customary system such as being based in the
local community and the need for community involvement, they
also differ in dramatic ways. The customary courts traditionally
addressed predominately inter-family and/or inter-community
disputes. Their method of dispute resolution was predominantly
consensual decision-making aimed at balancing collective and
individual interests. They commonly imposed sanctions based on
the best interest of the community. And judicial compulsion was
largely unheard of-offenders would usually appear voluntarily,
seeking forgiveness and reintegration into the community, and
judgments were enforced through social pressure alone. The focus
was clearly restorative justice.
Today, the Rwandese government believes that punitive justice
is a prerequisite for reconciliation. With retributive justice as its
goal, the Rwandan government has taken the traditional
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restorative process described above and, through the power of the
state, granted the contemporary Gacaca courts jurisdiction over all
but the most egregious cases of genocide and crimes against
humanity. The courts have been laden with substantive and
procedural rules, from sentencing guidelines to the authority of
the state to subpoena witnesses. At the same time, the hope is to
rebuild the community.
Gacaca jurisdiction is intended to shift power to the local
community, to strengthen and unify the people, and to make
"justice" more visible. The system's premise is the belief that
Rwanda's fiture lies with the ability of its people to rehabilitate tile
country. Thus tile Gacaca courts have the dual goals of "retributive
justice and community rebuilding."
This raises another major impediment-the lack of community.
A significant obstacle to this community-based program is that
the composition and the interrelationships in the communities
have dramatically changed as the result of the Rwandese armed
conflict and genocide. The recent villagization program which
relocates people from the hillsides to newly created villages further
exasperates the lack of functioning communities as the current
inhabitants have no historical connection with one another.
Communities that never were are difficult to 'rebuild'.
The contemporary Gacaca courts are completely dependent on
community participation and support. The state has set them up
as community forums. Each cell or local community selected
twenty-four local representatives or judges, and community
members are expected to investigate the genocide offenses
committed within their own communities. In total, over 250,000
Gacaca Judges were selected.
The country has created a confession option for persons
charged with all but the most serious charges. Persons, who
provide accurate and complete confessions, plead guilty and
apologize to the victims, are entitle to a reduced sentence. Some
question the veracity of some of tile confessions.
There were 500 confessions in 1997 and approximately
9,000 by the end of 1998. Over 2,000 confessions were
received in the weeks following the execution on 24 April
1998 of 22 defendants found guilty of genocide. About
15,000 detainees had confessed by 1999 and
approximately 20,000 detainees by early 2000. The slow
and cumbersome hearing and review process, and lack of
personnel, insured that at any given time only one-
fourth of the confessions were verified by the Public
Prosecution Department. To make matters worse, tile
18,000 or so detainees who confessed to genocide-
related crimes are housed in the same facilities as
detainees who could resent their confessions. Their safety
or protection from reprisals is questionable."
While there is significant support for the contemporary Gacaca
courts, especially among those suspects languishing in prison,-"
there are many who are skeptical. Time will tell. Contemporary
Gacaca courts are still in their infancy. In June 2002, the country
started a four-month pilot project with eighty courts. By
December 2002, some 600 courts had opened. The goal is to have
an estimated 10,000 courts in operation. They are expected to
address the judicial backlog within three to five years.
My concerns are first whether tile focus on retributive versus
restorative justice may backfire as each may reach a different end.
Amnesty International has stated, "Rwandese people need justice,
not vengeance."" Second, whether the decision to take an organic,
grassroots dispute resolution method and imposed top down
substantive and procedural requirements may in the end be the
demise of tile attempt to discover the truth, to find justice, and to
bring peace and reconciliation to Rwanda.
PROFESSOR MAUREEN LAFLIN, Director of Clinical Programs at the
University of Idaho College of Law, recently returned from a six month
sabbatical in South Africa where she participated in a course entitled
"Training for Transformation: Adapting Paulo Freire to our Changing
Reality" with forty women from fourteen countries, including four
women from Rwanda.
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